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Debt-Equity Conversions,
Debt-for-Nature Swaps, and
the Continuing World Debt Crisis
DANIEL H. COLE*
The world debt crisis, which erupted in 1981-82, imperiled both
commercial credit banks and their sovereign debtors. Defaults on
billions of dollars' worth of risky loans made it impossible for debtor
countries to attract new capital for investment and economic growth,
and raised the specter of massive losses-and even failure-for the
creditor banks. A decade later, the debt crisis largely has abated for
the commercial banks. By increasing loan loss reserves' and
restructuring or converting their high-risk debt holdings, the banks
have reduced substantially their financial exposure.2
Their sovereign debtors have not fared so well. The various
debt restructuring agreements and conversion programs, including
debt-equity and debt-for-nature swaps, have provided them some
"relief' from immediate economic ruin, but no real reduction in net
debt. Today, the large debtor nations carry far more foreign debt than
when the crisis began.3
* Assistant Professor, Indiana University School of Law-Indianapolis.
I am grateful to Professor John H. Barton of Stanford Law School for his helpful
comments on drafts of this article. I remain exclusively responsible for the contents.
1. "In mid-1987, a number of the major U.S. banks set aside additional, relatively
substantial reserves against their problematic international loans." Michael Blackwell &
Simon Nocera, The Impact of Debt to Equity Conversion: An Explanation and Assessment
of Debt-Equity Swaps, FIN. & DEv. 15, 16 (June 1988).
2. In fact, the banks have succeeded so well in this that it may discourage them from
selling on the secondary market debt obligations they still hold. See Stuart M. Berkson &
Bruce A. Cohen, Tax Implications of Debt-for-Equity Swaps, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 575, 576-77 (1989). The Appendix at the end of this article shows the growth in
total external debt for representative countries between 1981 and 1988.
3. On the other hand, according to a recent report of the United Nations Commission
on Transnational Corporations, "[w]hile outstanding debt had risen sharply during most of
the 1980's, actual (as opposed to contractual) amortization and interest payments have not."
U.N. Comm'n on Transnat'l Corps., Role of Transnational Corporations in Services,
Including Transborder Data Flows: Role of Transnational Banks - Report to the Secretary
General, Multinat'l Serv., July 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File
[hereinafter UNCTC Report]. On the rise in external debt throughout the 1980's for
representative countries, see the Appendix to this article.
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To be fair, proponents of debt-equity and debt-for-nature swaps
never claimed that such agreements, by themselves, would solve the
debt crisis; almost everyone cautioned ambiguously that debt
conversion schemes were "no panacea."4  Nonetheless, both the
academic and popular presses have portrayed them as effective tools
of debt reduction.'
This Article examines the effects of debt-equity and debt-for-
nature swaps on debtor country economies during the years 1983
through 1989. Part I briefly retraces the origins of the debt crisis
through the early attempts at debt restructuring. Parts II and IlI,
respectively, examine the two major debt conversion innovations of
the 1980's: debt-equity and debt-for-nature swaps. It will be seen
that during the last half of the 1980's, these schemes benefitted
participating banks, investors and special interest groups more than
debtor countries. They neither reduced enough debt nor produced
sufficient economic growth to be considered useful debt relief tools
for sovereign debtors. In addition, debt swaps tended to fuel
inflation, increase domestic debt and jeopardize debtor government
sovereignty over domestic economies and resources. For these
reasons, in the late 1980's many debtors became increasingly
reluctant to participate in the new conversion schemes.
Part IV of this Article considers recent developments in debt
conversion schemes and assesses their potential role in ending the
debt crisis. On the one hand, debt-equity swaps appear destined for
obsolescence, though not only because of sovereign debtors' concerns.
As the banks reduce their exposure to risky loans, partly by restruc-
turing debt, partly by increasing loan-loss reserves and partly by
selling discounted debt on the secondary market for swaps, they are
4. See, e.g., PEDRO-PABLO KUCZYNSKI, LATIN AMERICAN DEBT 170 (1988) ("the
concept [of debt-for-equity] is not a panacea for the debt problem"); THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC GROWTH, CONFERENCE ON
DEBT/EQUITY CONVERSION: A STRATEGY FOR EASING THIRD WORLD DEBT 5 (1987)
[hereinafter HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE] (comments of Martin W. Schubert,
Chairman, European Interamerican Finance Corporation) ("The debt/equity conversion
scheme should not be viewed as some type of panacea that will end the debt crisis ....");
J. Eugene Gibson & Randall K. Curtis, A Debt-for-Nature Blueprint, 28 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 331, 412 (1990) ("Debt-for-nature swaps are not a panacea to the LDCs'
debt and environmental problems.").
5. See, e.g., Marilyn Post, Comment, The Debt-for-Nature Swap: A Long-Term
Investment for the Economic Stability of Less Developed Countries, 24 INT'L LAW. 1071,
1086 (1990); Claude Regin, U.S. Calls For More Conservation Schemes For Debtor
Countries, THE REUTER LIB. REP., Nov. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires
File.
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less anxious to sell remaining debt below market value, thereby
eliminating the chief incentive for debt-equity swaps.6 Even if the
banks continued to sell debt on the secondary market, it is doubtful
that debt-equity swaps could retire enough debt to make them a viable
debt relief tool for larger debtor countries.
Debt-for-nature swaps, on the other hand, appear to be evolving
into a more useful tool for truly significant debt relief. Banks will
continue to finance debt-for-nature swaps long after debt-equity swaps
become uneconomical; this is because the former provide additional
incentives, namely, an opportunity to gain the publicity and goodwill
that come from funding popular causes such as natural resource
conservation.7 To become a more effective source of debt relief,
however, debt-for-nature swaps will have to (1) mine greater sources
of debt financing than the private commercial banks have been able
to provide, and (2) increase their range of applications beyond nature
conservation. There are recent signs that both these conditions can
and will be met. In 1990, creditor governments decided to make their
publicly held debts available for the first time for swapping.' In
addition, environmental organizations, such as the World Wildlife
Fund, recently have begun designing debt-swap projects that go
beyond conservation to environmental restoration and pollution
control, where the benefits for debtor countries are clear, direct and
substantial.9 These developments have already reignited debtor
country interest in debt-for-nature swaps. This is not to say that
swaps will become a cure-all for the debt crisis, but that they may
make a more significant contribution to debt relief than they have so
far.
Nevertheless, Part V concludes, if the international financial
community is determined to end the debt crisis, it must look beyond
debt conversion schemes to more radical and more productive tools
6. When a bank acts to reduce the amount owed to it by a debtor nation-either by
renegotiating the loan on terms more favorable to the borrower, or by engaging in a
swap-the secondary market in debt paper should respond by valuing the bank's outstanding
debt paper more highly, since it is now more likely that the debtor nation will be able to
repay the debt. This very improvement in the quality of its outstanding debt, however,
renders the bank less likely to see any advantage in entering into further swaps.
7. See, e.g., Jonathan Lynn, E. Europe Considers Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Reuters, Apr.
2, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File. C' 'What do we get out of it [a debt-
for-nature swap]--experience, expertise, contacts and good will,' Jaap Kool, General
Manager of the NMB Bank (Vienna) AG told Reuters.").
8. See, e.g., Peter Passell, Washington Offers Mountain of Debt To Save Forests, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 22, 1991, at Cl. See also infra notes 121-124 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 119-120 and accompanying text.
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that actually reduce net external debt and interest payments, so that
debtor countries reasonably may expect to meet their obligations
without bankrupting their domestic economies. Specifically, it is time
for Western governments and private commercial banks to reconsider
the option of debt forgiveness.'0 By canceling outright a substantial
portion of sovereign debt, the international financial community
would enable debtor countries to create or enlarge hard currency
reserves over time. Dedication of these hard currency reserves to
investment and economic growth eventually could lead to improve-
ment of the debtor countries' credit standings and make them more
stable members of the international community for the future.
I. THE WORLD DEBT CRISIS OF 1981-82
John Maynard Keynes reputedly said that if a customer owes the
bank £100, the customer has a problem; if a customer owes the bank
£1 million, the bank has a problem. Early in the 1980's, commercial
banks found that they had a problem. After a decade of extending
easy credit to countries on the theory that states, unlike business
enterprises, could not go bankrupt," Western banks and governments
suddenly found many of their "customers" teetering on the brink of
insolvency; debtor nations could not meet their repayment schedules.
The magnitude of this episode-the amount of debt and number of
nations in technical default-was unprecedented. 2
The problem was worst in Latin America. Nearly the entire
continent of South America, as well as Mexico, defaulted. During the
1970's, these countries constructed massive economic development
programs on a foundation of easy credit made available by interna-
tional commercial banks and Western governments. Between 1973
and 1983, Latin American external debt (including Mexico's) rose
from about $48 billion to about $350 billion, amounting to fully fifty-
eight percent of the gross regional product. 13 By late 1981, these
countries found themselves caught between a rock and a hard place,
as export earnings fell in the face of a deepening international
10. James D. Robinson H, Concluding Impressions, in THIRD WORLD DEBT, THE NEXT
PHASE 102 (Edward R. Fried & Philip H. Trezise eds., 1989).
11. See KUCZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 5 (citing WALTER B. WRISTON, RISK AND OTHER
FouR LETrER WORDS 1551 (1986)).
12. Steven M. Cohen, Comment, Give Me Equity or Give Me Debt: Avoiding a Latin
American Debt Revolution, 10 U. PA. J. INT'L BUS. L. 89, 95 (1988).
13. KUCZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 14.
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recession, while interest rates on their debts grew to "double the level
of reparations that Germany found intolerable in the prewar era that
produced Hitler."' 4  The commercial banks were slow to react to
the downturn in the world economy and failed to foresee its effects
on their debtors' abilities to make payments. When the banks finally
did react, they abruptly curtailed all new lending, precipitating the
suspension of debt service, first by Mexico in August 1982; other
Latin American countries quickly followed suit. 5
A similar scenario played itself out in other parts of the world,
such as in Eastern Europe, where debtor nations were feeling the
effects of a decade of imprudent borrowing. For example, by 1981
Poland was in the midst of a steep decline in domestic production
which-combined with decreasing exports to hard-currency countries,
increasing inflation and an insufficient supply of raw materials,
components and spare parts-made it impossible for the Polish
government to meet its international debt repayment schedule.'6
For Poland, as for many Latin American countries, banks and
Western governments were forced to reschedule debt payments.17
They had little choice. After all, as the banks knew when they made
the loans, a debtor country cannot go bankrupt. 8 Brazil could not
be forced into liquidating its assets to repay its debt.19 A court
judgment against the Polish government, even if one could be
obtained, would be largely unenforceable. The banks' only real
options were to reschedule the debts or write them off as losses, with
14. LAWRENCE MALKIN, THE NATIONAL DEBT 72-73 (1987).
15. KUCZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 86.
16. ZBIGNIEW M. FALLENBUCHL, THE POLISH ECONOMY IN THE YEAR 2000 1-2 (1988).
17. See generally ILIANA ZLOCH-CHRISTY, DEBT PROBLEMS OF EASTERN EUROPE 105-
113 (1987).
18. Pieder Konz, The Third World Debt Crisis, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REV.
527, 529 (1989) ("There is no such institution-no chapter eleven-in international law when
sovereign borrowers are concerned. The only avenue available is debt renegotiation and
restructuring .... "). Creation of a Chapter 11-like mechanism for sovereign debtors has
recently been suggested. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cohen, An International Chapter 11, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 11, 1987, at A23; Ruben Sklar, Comment, Renegotiation of External Debt: The
Allied Bank Case and the Chapter 11 Analogy, 17 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 59 (1985).
19. The only practical way for a country to liquidate its assets, according to economists,
is to lower the standard of living of its citizens. See, e.g., DARRELL DELAMAIDE, DEBT
SHOcK: THE FULL STORY OF THE WORLD CREDIT CRISIS 9-10 (1984). Of course, debtor
nations have strong practical reasons not to default on their debts. Default can lead to
seizure of assets abroad, restrictions on future borrowing, and ostracism from international
trade. See John K Shubin & Daniel J. Gibby, The Promotion of Debt-Equity Swaps in Latin
America: A Survey of the Regulatory Regimes and the International Policy Framework, 20
U. MIAMI INER=-AM. L. REV. 31, 38 (1988).
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the latter course entailing grave financial consequences for the banks,
their shareholders and their managers.2'
Banks and debtor nations each presumed that rescheduling debt
repayments would defuse the crisis; smaller payments extended over
a longer time period would allow the debtor country to invest more
capital in production and economic growth.2' This idea generally
has proved a mistake. Rescheduling does not correct the underlying
problems which prevented debtor nations from meeting repayment
schedules in the first place. Indeed, rescheduling "hinders future
economic development in the debtor nation by assuring that financial
gains will be utilized to service the debt."22 At best, debt reschedul-
ig "temporarily stabilize[s]" strained relations between debtor and
creditors.
In the case of Poland, debt rescheduling contributed substantially
to a steady increase in net debt throughout the 1980's, while the
Polish government's ability to make payments steadily declined. In
1985, for example, Poland allocated $2.5 billion to service a debt of
$29.3 billion; the following year, as Poland's debt rose to $33.5 bil-
lion, the government could repay only $1.96 billion.24
Finally, in 1987, several major U.S. banks set aside substantial
additional loan loss reserves, tacitly acknowledging the failure of
rescheduling to ease the crisis, and signalling their willingness to
enter the debt swapping markets.' Attention was shifting from
debt restructuring to conversion, specifically to the debt-equity swap.
20. Many banks had made imprudent loans in excess of their net assets. For them,
writing off the loans as losses would have meant instant bankruptcy. See Cohen, Comment,
supra note 12, at 98-99. Other banks might have survived the losses, but not without
suffering deep financial wounds.
21. See Cohen, Comment, supra note 12, at 97-98.
22. Id. at 100-101 (which continues, "The debtor nation thus faces dual and conflicting
objectives: growth and debt service .... Because the amount of capital available for loans
is finite, any increased commitment to debt rescheduling must result in proportionate
decreases in new lending, and trade financing.")
23. Anant K. Sundaram, Swapping Debt for Debt in Less-Developed Countries: A Case
Study of a Debt-for-Nature Swap in Ecuador, 2 INT'L ENVTL. AFF. 67, 67 (1990).
24. FALLENBucHL, supra note 16, at 2. On the other hand, debt rescheduling did help
improve Poland's export performance. While, in absolute terms, Poland's debt-service ratio
remained poor, it did improve throughout the decade. See UNCTC Report, supra note 3.
25. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 1, at 16.
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LI. THE ADVENT OF DEBT CONVERSION SCHEMES: THE DEBT-
EQuITY SwAP
A. Structure and Effects
Banks and sovereign debtors originally viewed the debt-equity
conversion scheme as an attempt to "make the best of a bad situa-
tion."2 6  Since then, even a few bankers have acknowledged that
debt-equity swaps ultimately provide few tangible benefits for
debtors.27 Most benefits flow to the creditor banks and investors
with whom the swaps are arranged.
The debt-equity swap works as follows: The creditor bank,
recognizing the impaired nature of the debt paper it holds, sells it at
a discount on the secondary market to an investor interested in doing
business in the debtor state.28 The investor-cum-creditor sells the
debt back to the debtor state either for an interest in some govern-
ment-owned industry or for its partial or full dollar value in local
currency. These proceeds are then invested locally in other ven-
tures.
29
The conversion from debt to equity theoretically relieves the
debtor nation's burden of debt servicing. With debt financing, the
debtor had to make regular hard-currency payments, regardless of the
26. Derek Asiedu-Akrofi, A Comparative Analysis of Debt-Equity Swap Programs in
Five Major Debtor Countries, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 537, 572-573 (1989).
27. See, e.g., HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 52 (remarks of
Edwin M. Truman, Director of the International Finance Division, Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System) ('Debt swaps per se are not likely to affect significantly the net
external liability position of the [debtor] country, since they only substitute one form of
external obligation for another. They improve a country's net external position only to the
extent that the external debt is repurchased at a discount in terms of local currency.
Moreover, such operations could, in the short run, increase the cash drain on the country if
the swap program encouraged private capital outflows or facilitated the repatriation of capital.
More broadly, the host country, which in many cases sees itself rationed out of international
financial markets, must consider, in effect, whether the foreign exchange associated with a
given investment inflow is best devoted to the retirement of debt or to some other purpose.").
On the other hand, debt swaps may provide an intangible benefit for sovereign debtors by
keeping open lines of communication between debtors and creditors.
28. Banks traditionally have not been interested in investing in debtor state economies;
that is why debt-equity transactions typically involve sale of the debt paper to a third-party
investor. Cohen, Comment, supra note 12, at 111. However, banks have recently begun to
take a much more active role as investors and brokers in debt-equity transactions. See
Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 569.
29. However, investment options will usually be restricted by local law. Shubin &
Gibby, supra note 19, at 44.
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performance of its domestic economy. With equity financing, by
contrast, the creditor/investor must rely on performance of the
investment for its return; there is no guaranteed payment.3 ° Relieved
from making payments on its external debt, the debtor nation can
dedicate hard currency reserves (assuming it has any) to capital
investment and economic growth.3' Further, growth resulting from
foreign investment is fiscally healthier than growth obtained through
debt financing because it tends to diversify the economy, thereby
decreasing the effect of market fluctuations.32 In practice, the
supposed relief from debt payments has proved illusory. As local
currency is exchanged for debt paper, the money supply increases,
spurring inflation. According to one study, "the conversion of as
little as five percent of outstanding debt to commercial banks could
lead to an increase of thirty-three to fifty-nine percent in the domestic
money supply. '33 The debtor government can float bonds to protect
against inflation,' 4 but this turns the debt-equity swap into a debt-
for-debt exchange. Instead of international debt, the government
winds up making payments on an internal debt, which tends to be
more expensive because interest rates are usually higher on the
domestic debt market (depending on rates of exchange). Domestic
debt financing also can result in "substantial crowding-out by placing
30. Id at 35.
31. Id at 40, 65. As foreign debt is reduced, interest payments decrease corresponding-
ly. However, any savings in interest payments can be offset by the investment returns which
flow out the country. Id. at 65.
32. Id at 66. Economic diversification may be further enhanced in cases where the
debt-equity swap results in the privatization of state-owned industries. See Cohen, Comment,
supra note 12, at 113. However, it has been argued that debt-equity swaps do not, in fact,
result in any additional foreign investment. See infra note 40 and accompanying text.
33. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 1, at 16. Mexican officials have alleged that
inflation there increased between three and five percent for every $100 million of debt
converted to equity between 1986 and 1987. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 560. Some
commentators argue, however, that the inflation threat is overstated. They claim that the
effect is precisely the same as with any new foreign investment. See Cohen, Comment,
supra note 12, at 121. Nevertheless, debtor countries concerned with inflation have limited
the amount of swapping they will allow over a certain period of time. See, e.g., Asiedu-
Akrofi, supra note 26, at 561.
34. Using bonds to finance debt purchases instead of cash will avoid inflation because
the money supply should either remain stable or actually decrease. See Shubin & Gibby,
supra note 19, at 70-71.
35. Id On the other hand, international debts must be paid in hard currency, while
internal debts can be paid in local currency. If the difference in value between local currency
and some hard currency, such as the U.S. dollar, is wide enough, it may offset the interest
rate differential. In any case, debtor nations would surely prefer to conserve their hard
currency reserves for capital investment and economic growth, rather than debt servicing.
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upward pressure on interest rates, thereby squeezing out domestic
economic agents. 36 In addition, funds dedicated to repurchasing
debt are not available for other important purposes, such as education
or social welfare. UNICEF has reported that the world's least
developed countries have cut their education budgets in recent years
by about fifty percent per person, primarily to avoid falling deeper
into debt.37  Of course, this problem exists, to a greater or lesser
extent, whether the debtor nation converts its debt to equity or simply
continues to make payments on it. Either way, however, there is an
unstated assumption that the debtor has the hard currency on reserve
for making debt payments in the first place. In some cases, such as
Poland, this assumption is unwarranted. 8
Exchanging equity for debt can also create a political problem
for debtor nations if foreign investors gain control over important
sectors of the domestic economy.39 A debtor government can avoid
that effect, however, simply by enacting regulations limiting foreign
investors to minority stakes in domestic companies. This, however,
in turn, may diminish the attractiveness of debt-equity deals in the
eyes of potential investors.
In most cases, the debtor nation realizes little direct benefit from
a debt-equity swap. According to some critics, swaps merely
subsidize foreign investment that would have occurred anyway, since
investors are counseled never to make an investment at a discount
that they would not have made at full value.40 To the extent this is
true, a debt-equity investor merely enjoys a discount that otherwise
would not have been available, and which is provided ultimately by
the debtor nation. The debtor, however, can share in the investors'
boon by splitting the discount, e.g., by taking a transaction fee off the
top.41  In addition, debt-equity programs can provide indirect
benefits for sovereign debtors. Like all forms of foreign investment,
debt-equity swaps can create employment and bring new technologies
36. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 1, at 17.
37. See Eve Burton, Debt for Development: A New Opportunity for Nonprofits,
Commercial Banks, and Developing States, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 233, 237 (1990).
38. See supra note 24 and accompanying text. See also Daniel H. Cole, Cleaning Up
Krakdw: Poland's Ecological Crisis and the Political Economy of International Environmen-
tal Assistance, 2 CoLo. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 205, 217-20 (1991).
39. Burton, supra note 37, at 237.
40. See, e.g., Shubin & Gibby, supra note 19, at 72.
41. Michael Chamberlin et al., Sovereign Debt Exchanges, 1988 U. ILL. L. REv. 415,
425-26.
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and management expertise to the debtor country.42 Moreover, by
channeling debt-equity investments to export-oriented industries,
debtor governments should be able to improve their balance of
trade.43
Even with these various direct and indirect benefits, sovereign
debtors only profit from debt-equity swaps if they result in a net
decline in hard currency transfers out of the country. If, however,
dividend payments to foreign debt-equity investors are equal to or
greater than the debtor's previous interest and principal payments on
the redeemed external debt, then the swap program does not benefit
the debtor country at all; it merely exchanges one form of external
liability for another.4'
In the best of circumstances, debtor nations reasonably can
expect only limited debt reduction from debt-equity swaps because
only debts owed to commercial banks can be swapped for equity.
Some countries owe only a minority of their debts to private
commercial banks; the rest they owe directly to Western governments
and multilateral development banks (MDBs) such as the World Bank
and International Monetary Fund.45 Governments, for political
reasons, do not sell debt obligations to private investors,46 and the
MDBs are prohibited by their charters from doing so.' Thus, debt-
42. Id.
43. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 1, at 16.
44. Of course, increased export earnings resulting indirectly from debt-equity investment
help to offset dividend payments abroad. Id.
45. Poland, whose loans have recently been partially forgiven, see infra notes 143-149
and accompanying text, was a prime example. See Cole, supra note 38, at 230. Like
Poland, most African countries owe the majority of their external debts to sovereign
creditors. See UNCTC Report, supra note 3. These African countries are also hampered by
underdeveloped capital markets that "severely limit the potential of debt-equity conversions."
Id at 22.
46. However, in late 1990, the "Paris Club," an informal club of Western creditor
nations, declared that its members were free to exchange debt for equity, nature or aid. See
Konrad von Moltke, Debt for Nature: The Second Generation, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 973,983 (1991). Shortly thereafter, the Bush Administration announced plans to sell
or donate its Latin American debt holdings for nature conservation projects. See Peter
Passell, Washington Offers Mountain of Debt To Save Forests, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1991,
at Cl. See also infra notes 122-123 and accompanying text. So far, no government has
actually offered to sell off LDC debt to private debt-equity investors. In fact, it remains
unlikely that any government will do so. It is one thing for a government to donate or sell
debt for some public purpose, such as a debt-for-nature swap; it is quite another for a
government to sell debt to some private investor for private profit. See infra note 131 and
accompanying text.
47. See Gibson & Curtis, supra note 4, at 386.
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equity swaps have only limited effect in reducing the debtor nations'
burdens, tending instead to be relatively more useful to the commer-
cial banks involved.
Debt-equity swaps chiefly benefit creditor banks by reducing
their financial exposure from precarious loans. For banks, carrying
and continually restructuring insecure debts is an onerous burden
which interferes with their ability to attract new capital. Selling off
debt paper, albeit at a discount, relieves banks of this load and
enables them to enter into new, safer lending agreements. 48  Even
small debt-equity swaps (worth, say, $1 million) that would not
provide much debt relief for the debtor country nevertheless might
reduce significantly the participating bank's exposure.
For American banks, the cost of entering into debt-for-equity
arrangements may be high, because debt-equity transactions typically
constitute accounting events. As a consequence, banks must absorb
fairly substantial losses, which can extend far beyond any single
transaction. It is common practice for American banks to list debts
on their books at face value (principal plus interest), regardless of
their actual market values. Once the bank sells some of the debt,
however, a market price is set, and standard accounting practices
usually (but not always) require that the bank adjust its books to
reflect that price.49 This reduces the net assets of the bank, affecting
other potential investments and shareholder dividends.50 Whether
this discourages the banks from participating in debt-equity transac-
tions is debatable. Some commentators maintain that ambiguities in
accounting practices for swaps is not, and should not be, a barrier to
48. Shubin & Gibby, supra note 19, at 41-42. By eliminating undesirable loans, a bank
improves its short-term liquidity, enabling it to enter new agreements. Id. at 63.
49. HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 32 (remarks of Mr. Gerald
B. Finneran, Senior Vice President, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.) ("[Tihe U.S. accountants
and banks held a meeting and decided swapping loans constituted an accounting event, which
meant the loans swapped must be marked to market. When Argentina, on the other hand,
decided to swap public sector debt for private sector debt, the U.S. banks and regulators, and
accountants agreed that a swap of private sector debt for public debt did not constitute an
accounting event. Therefore no write-downs were necessary by the U.S. banks."). See also
Cohen, Comment, supra note 12, at 118-119.
50. Shubin & Gibby, supra note 19, at 67-68. In fact, under a recent ruling by the U.S.
Department of the Treasury, banks might sometimes be better off giving away their debt for
charity, rather than selling it on the secondary market. Under Revenue Ruling 87-124, if a
bank donates its debt holdings to a less developed country for charitable purposes, the bank
may take a full-cost basis deduction in that debt. See, e.g., Tamara J. Hrynik, Note, Debt-
Nature-Swaps: Effective But Not Enforceable, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 141, 141-42
(1990).
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banks' participation.-1 In fact, despite accounting uncertainties, U.S.
banks, such as Manufacturers Hanover, Bankers Trust, Security
Pacific and Citicorp, increasingly have participated as brokers and
investors in debt-equity swaps.52 To date, however, most sales of
debt paper have come from European banks and smaller U.S. regional
banks with less exposure to high-risk debt, and correspondingly less
to fear from uncertain accounting requirements.53
Banks outside the United States do not operate under the same
accounting strictures; they do not have to write down remaining debts
after selling some portion at a discount on the secondary market.5 4
They therefore have no disincentive to participate in debt-equity
transactions. Indeed, some countries have created special incentives
to encourage their banks to participate. The Japanese government, for
example, has ruled that debt-equity conversion profits are exempt
from capital gains taxes even if the debts are converted at face
value.55
For most investors, debt-equity exchanges are truly a no-lose
situation, offering increased profit potential on investments they
would have made anyway. 56 In addition, debt-equity swaps some-
times provide investment opportunities otherwise unavailable in
markets that, under other circumstances, would be closed." Of
course, investing in debtor nations usually involves substantial
political and economic risks,58 but the magnitude of these risks is
51. HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 63 (remarks of Mr. Ronald
F. Harnek, Partner in the Executive Office, Peat Marwick Main) ("Accounting does not drive
a transaction, and accounting should not drive a transaction.").
52. See Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 569. The United States government has
recently entered into the accounting debate, in an effort to encourage banks to swap debt.
The authorities decided that banks can continue to carry loans on their books at face value
even after swapping some existing debt at the secondary market price. However, "[i]t
remains to be seen whether bank accountants will accept these principles." UNCTC Report,
supra note 3.
53. Blackwell & Nocera, supra note 1, at 15.
54. See HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 32 (remarks of Mr.
Gerald B. Finneran, Senior Vice President, Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc.) ("European
accountants and regulators have also been extremely cooperative with their banks .... [T]hey
have permitted swaps to be made without any write-downs.").
55. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 568.
56. Mexican officials have argued that as much as 80 percent of debt-equity investment
would have come into the country anyway. Alan Riding, Debt-Equity Swaps Draw Latin
Criticisms, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 2, 1989, at A29. See also supra note 40 and accompanying
text.
57. Chamberlin et al., supra note 41, at 419-20.
58. See, e.g., Shubin & Gibby, supra note9, at 70.
[30:57
1992] DEBT-EQUITY CONVERSIONS, DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS 69
not substantially affected by the fact that the investment is made
pursuant to a debt-equity exchange, except to the extent of any local
regulations restricting the use of local currency obtained through a
debt-equity swap, and timing restrictions on the repatriation of
investment profits. 9
B. Latin American Debt-Equity Swap Programs
Brazil pioneered the first debt-equity program in 1983. By 1987,
swapping had become, in the words of one banker, " 'the hottest
game in town.' "6 Through the end of 1987, between $13 and
$18 billion in Latin American debts had been traded on the secondary
market.6
1
Chile's debt-equity conversion program is the success story to
which all debt-equity proponents point. The program was established
in 1985 under Chapters 18 and 19 of the Compendium of Foreign
Exchange Regulations of the Banco Central de Chile. In the first
eighteen months of biweekly debt auctions, more than five percent of
Chile's net foreign debt (worth more than $1 billion) was converted
to equity,62 offsetting new debt creation. 63 The program brought
flight capital back to Chile, resulting in economic growth, and
reduced the government's principal and interest payments on its
debt.64 Between 1985 and 1988, Chile's total external debt declined
by about $740 million, while its gross national product grew by forty-
three percent to over $20 billion, and a government deficit of
59. The most common restriction on the use of local currency obtained in a debt-equity
swap requires that it be used to finance investments approved by the debtor government. See
Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 540. Virtually all debtor countries with active debt-equity
swap programs restrict the repatriation of profits. For example, Chile allows repatriation of
profits only after 10 years. Id. at 543, 554.
60. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 570 (remark attributed to Richard Marin, head of
Bankers Trust's asset enhancement operation in New York).
61. See id. at 539 (noting, by way of contrast, that $300 billion in Latin American debt
had been restructured in the same period).
62. HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 37 (remarks of William G.
Foulke, Managing Director of Bankers Trust).
63. Id. at 21 (remarks of Martin W. Schubert, Chairman, European InterAmerican
Finance Corp.).
64. Id. at 46-47 (remarks of Claudio Pardo, Director of the Central Bank of Chile and
Alternate Executive Director to the World Bank for Chile, Argentina, Uruguay, Paraguay,
Bolivia and Peru).
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$377 million became an $18 million surplus.65 On the other hand,
Chile's balance of trade decreased markedly between 1985 and 1988;
exports did increase during that period, but at a slower rate than
imports. 66
It is unclear how much of Chile's remarkable economic
performance can be attributed to its debt conversion program, which,
after all, by 1989 had reduced Chile's foreign debt by merely ten
percent at most.67  Commentators have praised the program's
structure, calling it "speedy and well-defined" and "straightforward
and clean. 68 The Chilean program's structure, however, does not
seem to differ fundamentally from the markedly less successful
programs of other Latin American countries.69  Its success may be
less a cause than an effect of Chile's other far-reaching economic
reforms.70  According to Dr. Claudio Pardo, Director of Chile's
Central Bank, a favorable macroeconomic climate is "essential to the
65. WoRLD BANK, WORLD TABLES 177, 179 (1989-90). Chile's total external debt was
US$20,384 million at year-end 1985, and was US$19,645 million at year-end 1988. Id. at
179. Chile's 1985 GNP of 2,291.2 billion pesos, id. at 177, is roughly US$14.2 billion, using
the 1985 average conversion ratio of 161.08 pesos/dollar. Id. at 179. Chile's estimated 1988
GNP of 4,984.0 billion pesos, id. at 177, converts to US$20.3 billion using the 1988 average
ratio of 245.05 pesos/dollar. Id. at 179. Chile's government deficit at year-end 1985 was
60.7 billion pesos, while its estimated surplus at year-end 1988 was 4.4 billion pesos. Id. at
177.
66. Chile's resource balance declined from 80.6 billion (1980) pesos at year-end 1985
to an estimated 70.2 billion (1980) pesos at year-end 1988. Id. at 177.
67. See HERIrAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 15 (remarks of Carl W.
Ludvik, Cofinancing Advisor for Commercial Banks at the World Bank).
68. Id. at 38 (remarks of William G. Foulke).
69. For comparative descriptions of the programs in Chile, Brazil, Argentina and
Mexico (as well as the Philippines), see Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26.
70. Throughout the late 1970s, Chile experimented with market-based economic
reforms, but achieved mixed results. See generally Stephany Griffith-Jones, CHILE TO 1991:
THE END OF AN ERA? (The Economist Intelligence Unit Special Report No. 1073) (1987).
In 1985, the same year it established its debt-equity conversion program, Chile also
committed itself to a demand-based economy, to achieve balance of payments equilibrium
in compliance with its agreements with the I.M.F. and the international financial community.
l& at 31. The I.M.F. approved an "extended fund facility" for Chile, permitting a reduction
in its current account deficit and securing a balance in public finances through 1987. The
extended fund facility also enabled the Chilean government to reach payment extension
agreements with its private creditors. Id. at 32. At the same time, the government re-
committed itself to gradual privatization of state-owned enterprises, focussing on selling
many shares to individual small investors. Id. at 46. Also in 1985, Chile adopted its
"Programa Trienal," which committed the government to create an export-based development
strategy. See id at 65. Perhaps most importantly, Chile's economy benefitted mightily from
rising copper prices in the mid-1980s. KUCZYNSIU, supra note 4, at 202.
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success of any debt conversion scheme. ' 71 Without a pre-existing
favorable macroeconomic climate, investors won't bring their dollars
in, no matter what the discounts. This has been a clear lesson of
failed debt-equity swap programs in other Latin American countries,
such as Brazil and Mexico.
Brazil was the first country to establish a plan for converting
debt to equity. Between 1983 and 1987, debt-equity swaps had
reduced Brazil's net debt to foreign banks by an estimated $8 bil-
lion.72 While this is more than four times the amount of debt-equity
conversions transacted under Chile's successful program," it
amounts to only about six percent of the $114.59 billion that Brazil
owed to foreign banks in 1988.' 4 In fact, the interest due annually
on that debt exceeds the total amount of debt converted to equity in
Brazil between 1983 and the end of 1988. 75 Unlike in Chile, the
amount of Brazilian debt converted to equity did not even begin to
offset new lending. Debt-equity conversion in Brazil did not succeed
as a debt prevention tool, let alone a debt reduction tool. Between
the beginning of 1983 and the end of 1988, Brazil's total external
debt increased from $92.2 to $114.6 billion.76  Gross national
product did, however, steadily increase throughout the period, and
Brazil's balance of trade surplus more than doubled between 1983
and 1988.77 Nevertheless, in 1989 Brazil suspended its debt-equity
program because of its failure to relieve the government's debt burden
and its inflationary impacts;78 in 1988 alone, debt swaps expanded
the Brazilian money supply by $1.8 billion, "an amount equal to one-
third of the monetary base."'79 Brazil's unfortunate experience with
71. HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 47. But see KuCzYNsKI,
supra note 4, at 192.
72. Walter D. Stuber, The Brazilian Debt-Equity Swap Program, 12 HASTINGS INT'L
& COM. L. REV. 613, 634 (1989).
73. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 545 ("Between June 1985 and May 1987, Chile's
external debt was reduced by about 1,888 million dollars.").
74. WORLD BANK, WORLD TABLES 147 (1989-90).
75. Stuber, supra note 72, at 634.
76. WORLD BANK, WORLD TABLES 147 (1989-90).
77. Id. at 145.
78. Stuber, supra note 72, at 634 n.39.
79. Eliana A. Cardoso & Daniel Dantas, Brazil, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT:
How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 129, 147 (John Williamson ed., 1990). The Brazilian
government did try to offset inflationary pressures by issuing bonds to pay for debt buy-
backs, but with high real interest rates, the net result was an increase in total debt service.
Id. At least one economist has challenged the assertion that Brazil's debt-equity swap
program was primarily responsible for the inflation problem. William R. Cline, Senior
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debt-equity swaps "illustrates why many economists have concluded
that the program's risks outweigh its purported benefits."8
Mexico's experience with debt-conversion schemes was similar
to Brazil's, only much shorter. Mexico's program lasted only a year-
and-a-half, from April 1986 to October 1987. In that time, approxi-
mately $1.1 billion in Mexican debt obligations were extinguished,
amounting to no more than two percent of the country's total external
debts.81 The Mexican government scrapped the program largely
because of allegations that for every $100 million of debt converted
to equity, inflation increased by between three and five percent.8 2
It is difficult to measure the effects of such a short-lived program,
and impossible to predict what might have resulted had Mexico
continued the program over a longer period, but even proponents of
debt conversion have admitted that debt-equity conversions could
never have "scratch[ed] the surface in offsetting new debt creation"
in Mexico. The $1.1 billion in debt converted to equity there
between 1986 and 1987 amounted to only thirteen percent of new
debt created during the same period of time.84
While the Latin American debtor nations have had, at best,
mixed success with debt-equity conversion schemes, investors and
participating commercial lenders have benefitted consistently. Many
of the large banks have played the secondary market, and few if any
of them "have lost money on their developing country sovereign
borrowers, who remain important clients for future lending. 85
Indeed, the banks have been so successful at reducing their high-risk
debt exposure through debt-equity swaps and other devices that their
Fellow at the Institute for International Economics, claims that the primary culprit was
increased domestic spending, as the new democratically elected regime in Brazil "engaged
in patronage politics." William R. Cline, Comment, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: How
MUCH HAS HAPPENED?, supra, at 169, 171 (citation omitted). According to Mr. Cline's
figures, the debt-equity swap program only added about three percent to the money supply,
"hardly enough to provoke 1,000 percent inflation." l
80. Cardoso & Dantas, supra note 79, at 145.
81. Asiedu-Akrofi, supra note 26, at 560.
82. I&
83. HERITAGE FOUNDATION CONFERENCE, supra note 4, at 21 (remarks of Martin W.
Schubert).
84. See WORLD BANK, WORLD TABLEs 395 (1989-90) (growth of external debt from
US$100.88 billion at year-end 1986 to US$109.29 billion at year-end 1987).
85. Konz, supra note 18, at 533-34.
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incentive to swap has clearly diminished. 6 They are much less
anxious today to sell remaining debt obligations at discount prices on
the secondary market.
It is more difficult to assess how well investors have done in
debt-equity swaps. Obviously, to the extent that they received
discounts on investments they would have made anyway, swaps were
simply a windfall for them.
III. DEBT-FOR-NATURE SWAPS
87
A. The Structure and Theory of Debt-for-Nature Swaps
In 1984, a World Wildlife Fund ecologist proposed a variation
on the debt-equity swap which replaced the profit-motivated investor
with an environmental organization interested in conserving natural
resources in debtor countries." This so-called debt-for-nature swap
is structured in much the same way as the debt-equity swap, but
instead of selling impaired debt to a private investor, the bank donates
or sells it at a discount to an international environmental group. That
group then transfers the debt paper to a local environmental organiza-
tion within the debtor country, which assigns the paper to its
government in exchange for local currency or interest-bearing bonds.
Those proceeds are then administered and invested in local environ-
mental projects.89 Alternatively, the debtor nation, in exchange for
the debt, may set aside conservation parks and sustainable use areas,
placing them under control of the local environmental organization.
Since the first debt-for-nature swap was executed in Bolivia in
1987,90 it has become most popular with the international environ-
86. See Stuart M. Berkson & Bruce A. Cohen, Tax Implications of Debt-for-Equity
Swaps, 12 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 575, 576-577 (1989).
87. This section expands on part of the author's earlier article on the potential role of
debt-for-nature swaps in relieving Poland's ecological crisis. Cole, supra note 38, at 226-28.
88. See Thomas E. Lovejoy III, Aid Debtor Nations' Ecology, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1984,
at A31.
89. See Marianne Lachman, Debt-for Nature Swaps: A Case Study in Transactional
Negotiation, 2 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 139, 143 (1989). Still, sovereignty issues are
implicated. See infra note 101 and accompanying text.
90. The swap involved the purchase by Conservation International of debt nominally
worth $650,000 and its return to the Bolivian government. For its part, the government
agreed to protect the Beni Biosphere and established an endowment worth $250,000 for that
purpose. WoRLD REsouRcEs INSTrTUTE, NATIONAL ENDOWMENTS: FINANCING REsOuRcE
CONSERVATION FOR DEVELOPMENT (International Conservation Financing Project Report 8)
8 (1989).
COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
mental community, the media, and the governments of developed
nations as a means to conserve the natural resources of developing
nations while apparently reducing their foreign debt burdens. The
conservation purpose certainly carries a compelling moral and
scientific appeal. Tropical forests, which "serve as a natural sink for
greenhouse gases and shelter the lion's share of the world's plant and
animal species," 91 are disappearing at an alarming rate. If the
destruction is not halted, they may all be gone within sixty years.92
Of the world's remaining rain forests, fifty percent are located in
Latin American countries,93 most of which are under tremendous
pressure, due to massive foreign debts, to exploit domestic natural
resources for their economic values.94 The debt-for-nature swap
tackles this problem from two directions. It compels conservation in
exchange for debt reduction, which, in turn, reduces the economic
pressure to recklessly exploit natural resources. According to U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency Chief William Reilly, debt-for-
nature swaps "make more than a marginal contribution to conserving
what remains of the rich flora and fauna and natural systems of debt-
burdened countries.""5
B. The Costs and Benefits of Debt-for-Nature Swaps for Sovereign
Debtors
For debtor nations, debt-for-nature swaps have been heralded as
a vast improvement over the progenitor debt-equity exchange because
no assets are transferred out of the country to pay off foreign
investors, and foreign interests gain no legal control over key
domestic industries and enterprises. 96 Proponents claim that debt-
for-nature swaps, like debt-equity transactions, relieve debtor nations'
debt servicing burdens. As foreign debt is reduced, interest payments
decrease correspondingly. Hard currencies previously dedicated to
91. Peter Passell, Washington Offers Mountain of Debt To Save Forests, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 22, 1991, at Cl.
92. See Post, Comment, supra note 5, at 1076.
93. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 4, at 332.
94. See Philip Shabecoff, Bolivia to Protect Lands in Swap to Lower Debt, N.Y. TIMES,
July 14, 1987, at C2.
95. Claude Regin, U.S. Calls for More Conservation Schemes For Debtor Countries,
THE REUTERS LIBR. REP., Nov. 2, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
96. See, e.g., Hrynik, Note, supra note 50, at 152-153. But, for better or worse,
international environmental organizations do frequently gain effective control over property
within the debtor country to the extent they control or influence the local environmental
organization which owns or administers the territory.
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make those payments ostensibly are freed for growth-inducing capital
investment." So far, however, the average debt-for-nature swap has
reduced debt by only between $1 and $5 million98-- too little to buy
any economic growth. In many cases, swaps merely reduce slightly
the debtor nation's obligation to pay out funds it did not have in the
first place.
Moreover, like debt-equity transactions, debt-for-nature swaps
tend to be either inflationary or require the debtor nation to take on
expensive domestic debt.9 The debtor government can avoid these
alternative problems if, instead of purchasing the debt paper with
local currency, it simply cedes lands to the local environmental
organization for conservation. This option, however, implicates
questions of sovereignty and democratic governance. These questions
are not merely theoretical. In Bolivia, Conservation International, a
local environmental group which gained control over forest lands
under a debt-for-nature swap, failed to consult with local residents
about its conservation plans. Inevitably, its administration of the area
outraged indigenous groups dependent on the forests for food and
fuel, creating political headaches for the Bolivian government." °
There is also substantial doubt as to how much control an
environmental organization actually obtains over the land or resources
a debtor government assigns to it pursuant to a debt-for-nature swap.
According to a resolution of the United Nations General Assembly,
states always retain ultimate sovereignty over their natural resources,
regardless of private property rights; this sovereignty cannot be ceded
97. Cohen, Comment, supra note 12, at 112 n.169.
98. Debt-for-Nature Swaps Not Applicable to Brazil, Ecologist Says, THE REUTERS BUS.
REP., Nov. 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
99. A minority of commentators maintain that the inflation threat is overstated. They
claim that the effect is precisely the same as with any new foreign investment. See Cohen,
Comment, supra note 12, at 121. However, the experiences of some Latin American
countries, such as Brazil and Mexico, with debt-equity conversion programs belle this. See
supra notes 72-84 and accompanying text.
100. See Burton, supra note 37, at 242-43. The Amazon Indians have since banded
together, creating an organization known as "Coordinadora de las Organizaciones Indfgenas
de la Cuenca Amaz6niea" (Indigenous Peoples' Organizations in the Amazon) (hereinafter
"COICA"). COICA represents nearly 1.2 million people from Peru, Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil
and Columbia, fighting for the recognition of indigenous property rights and a role in the
international political process. The group has criticized environmentalist groups operating
in the Amazon, who, they claim, "have shown a single-minded devotion to preserving the
environment, but not enough to the people who live there." Seema Sirohi, Environment:
Amazon Indians Say Indigenous People Left Out, INTER PREss SERV., Oct. 19, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
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or diluted.'' In practice this provision might not interfere with
debt-for-nature swaps, but it does reflect some very real enforceability
problems.
The first debt-for-nature swap, between Conservation Internation-
al and the government of Bolivia, contained no enforcement provi-
sions.' 2 Should the Bolivian government ever decide to renege on
its promise to conserve the land, the environmental organization
would have no legal recourse. Fortunately, the Bolivian government
has kept its promises; in fact, no government yet has reneged on a
debt-for-nature agreement. Still, there have been less extreme, but
nonetheless significant, compliance problems. Some debtor govern-
ments, in countries suffering from inflation, purposefully (and
probably sensibly under the circumstances) have retarded the process
of enacting protective legislation and laying out local currency
pursuant to debt-for-nature swaps; such foot-dragging has significantly
diluted the ecological benefits the swaps promised.
Enforcement problems aside, debt-for-nature swaps thus far have
proven useful only in a narrow range of environmental situations,
often corresponding only to the political interests of the environmental
organizations promoting the swaps. To the extent that a debtor nation
has had different environmental priorities than conservation, debt-for-
nature swaps have provided no help at all. Thus, for a heavily
indebted country like Poland, where pollution control and clean-up is
a critical priority," debt-for-nature swaps have had little to offer.
The one swap completed there to date conserved a relatively
unspoiled wetlands. In a country where forty percent of all water is
too polluted even for industrial use, where the soil in some regions
are so toxic that up to sixty percent of the food it yields is unfit for
human consumption, and where scientists predict that twenty-five
percent of all Poles will contract some form of pollution-related
cancer by the year 2000, it is wasteful to spend scarce funds to create
a wetlands preserve. 5 Fortunately for Poland and other heavily
101. G.A. Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess., 119th plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/5344/
Add.l/A/L.412/Rev.2 (1962), reprinted in 9 UNITED NATIONS RESOLUTIONS 107 (Dusan J.
Djonovich ed., 1974).
102. See Hrynik, Note, supra note 50, at 156.
103. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 4, at 357 n.124. See also Michael Potier, Swapping
Debt for Nature, OECD OBSERVER, August 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library,
ALLWLD File.
104. See Cole, supra note 38, at 208-16.
105. Id. at 213-215, 243.
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polluted debtor countries, the situation is changing. To their credit,
the environmental groups that design and promote swaps recently
have started to broaden their scope to promote not only nature
conservation, but also environmental clean-up and pollution con-
trol.1' 6  This should counteract the perception in some debtor
countries that international environmental organizations are less
interested in the environment than in gaining political control over
debtor country resources."0
Still, debt-for-nature swaps have not yet proven economically
beneficial for debtor countries. Between 1987, the year of the first
debt-for-nature swap, and 1990, about $100 million worth of debts
were converted for resource conservation.108 This is less than one
one-thousandth of overall Third World indebtedness,1°9 or about one
percent of Brazil's annual interest payments. °10 Even proponents of
debt-for-nature swaps admit that the combined effect on total debt of
all the swaps undertaken so far has been negligible.' Once again,
a major reason is the limited scope of debt-for-nature swaps-there
is only so much land suited and available for conservation. If debt-
for-nature swaps were extended to other purposes, such as pollution
control or clean-up, they might become greatly more useful to debtor
countries. The problem then would not be finding enough projects,
but finding enough funding."'
IV. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS AND THE FUTURE OF DEBT CONVER-
SION SCHEMES
In the late 1980s, debtor countries increasingly criticized debt
relief schemes, including both debt-equity and debt-for-nature swaps,
106. See infra note 119 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Marlise Simons, Brazil, Smarting from the Outcry over the Amazon,
Charges Foreign Plot, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989, at A14; Burton, supra note 37, at 242.
108. WORLD RESOURCES INsTrr TE, supra note 90, at 8.
109. Michael Potier, Swapping Debt for Nature, OECD OBSERVER, August 1990,
available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD File.
110. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
111. Gibson & Curtis, supra note 4, at 412.
112. A further limitation on the usefulness of debt-for-nature agreements is the fact that
before 1990, all debt conversion schemes, including debt-for-nature swaps, were financed by
private commercial banks. For political reasons, sovereign creditors never sold or donated
their debt holdings for any purpose. As a result, countries like Poland and most countries
in Africa, which owe the vast majority of their debts to creditor governments, could not
realize enough debt reduction to make the debt-for-nature swap a truly useful debt relief tool.
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for failing to reduce net debt and aggravating domestic economic
woes. In 1989, two Brazilian economists, Arno Meyer and Maria
Silvia Bastos Marques, conducted a study that found debt conversions
resulted in a net balance-of-payments loss for their country; they
concluded that debt swaps ultimately were harmful to Brazil.
113
That same year, Mauro Victor, a leading Brazilian ecologist, affirmed
that debt-for-nature swaps had little utility for his country, " 'given
the size of the country and the magnitude of its external debt.' 12114
Finally, in July 1989, the government of Brazil declared a unilateral
moratorium on interest payments to its commercial creditors. 5 In
other countries, such as Mexico, officials argued that debt swaps
replace, rather than stimulate, traditional investment.1 16 And Polish
officials warned against selling potentially valuable state-owned
properties at bargain prices in exchange for slight debt relief. 7
Instead, debtor nations called for real debt reduction.
The statistics on commercial bank-funded debt relief seem to
bear out the debtors' concerns. In a recent report to the Secretary
General of the United Nations, the U.N. Commission on Transnational
Corporations concluded:
The role played by transnational banks through the end of
1988 brought about practically no respite for debtor
countries. It will be recalled that although commercial
bank claims on 17 major debtor countries (including
Hungary and Poland) declined by over $20 billion between
1987 and 1988, the claims in 1988 were $56 billion more
than in 1982. Debt service as a proportion of exports of
goods and services in 1988 for 15 major debtor countries,
excluding Hungary and Poland, was nearly 40 percent and
was much higher for the latter two countries. The net
113. See Alan Riding, Debt-Equity Swaps Draw Latin Criticisms, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 2,
1989, at A29.
114. Debt-for-Nature Swaps NotApplicable to Brazil, Ecologist Says, THE REUTERS Bus.
REP., Nov. 3, 1989, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
115. After a year-and-a-half, this moratorium was finally lifted at the end of 1990. See
Jonathan Fuerbringer, Brazil Says It Will End Its Debt-Payments Ban, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18,
1990, at C2.
116. Riding, supra note 113 C" 'I would say that at least 80 percent of this money would
have come into Mexico anyway,' one senior official said, 'So why should we subsidize
it?' ").
117. International Finance, Debt-Equity Swaps Not a Present Option for Poland, Says
Official, DAILY REP. FOR ExEctrrlvEs (BNA), June 5, 1990, at A6, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, NWLTRS File.
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transfer of resources from the 15 major indebted countries
to the rest of the world has varied between 3-5 percent of
gross national product (GNP); this has been an important
factor leading to a decline in investment, per capita
consumption and expenditure on vital social services, such
as health and education.11 8
The inescapable conclusion is that, to date, the world debt crisis has
not been significantly alleviated by the myriad debt restructuring and
conversion schemes, including debt-equity and debt-for-nature swaps.
That does not mean, however, that all of these remedies should be
summarily scrapped. There is, in fact, good reason to hope that debt-
for-nature swaps, in particular, can be a more effective debt relief tool
in the coming decade than they have been so far.
This hope stems from two developments that took place in 1990.
First, environmental organizations began expanding debt-for-nature
swaps beyond conservation to meet the specific environmental needs
of debtor countries. The World Wildlife Fund began work on a plan
to help clean up Poland's Vistula River. This swap will generate only
about $50,000 in debt reduction," 9 but its significance far exceeds
its size. The Vistula swap may inspire more extensive use of debt-
for-nature swaps in Poland and other countries, since it apparently
offers a model for retiring truly significant amounts of debt over long
periods of time. Not all debtor nations have land areas lending
themselves readily to the classic, conservation-oriented, debt-for-
nature swap; on the other hand, all debtor countries certainly do have
particular environmental problems the resolution of which might be
encouraged by swaps similar to the Vistula agreement. This new
model gives debtor countries renewed incentive to participate in
swaps. Historically, sovereign debtors, especially in less developed
countries, have tended to view resource conservation as chiefly
beneficial to the developed world; 120 they have not perceived
118. UNCTC Report, supra note 3 (footnote & table omitted).
119. See Hilary F. French, Green Revolutions: Environmental Reconstruction in Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union, WORLDWATCH PAPER 99, at 48 (Nov. 1990).
120. Indeed, many leaders of less developed countries characterized conservationism as
a form of colonialism imposed by the industrialized north. Summit Highlights Debt-
Environment Link: Amazon Pact Presidents Reject Outside Interference, LATIN AMERICAN
REGIONAL REPORTS: BRAZIL, June 1, 1989, at 4. For an extreme statement of this view,
representative of one strain of thought in the LDCs, see Burton, Debt-Swaps: New Game in
Town, CHI-STIANITY & CRISIS, Mar. 7, 1988, at 63 ("Participation in debt swaps means
participation in an inequitable system that created the debt crisis ... where Third World
elites are rewarded by the North for pillaging their countries and repressing their people.").
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resource conservation as directly and substantially beneficial to either
their environments or their economies. Now, broadened use of debt-
for-nature swaps offers the prospect of immediate and tangible
benefits for these countries, including the possibility of achieving
unprecedented reductions in external debt. -
The second recent development in debt-for-nature swaps is the
participation of sovereign creditors. Late in 1990, the Paris Club, a
consortium of Western creditor countries, authorized its members for
the first time to sell or donate debts for swaps.22 Almost immedi-
ately, the Bush Administration announced plans to retire Latin
American debt obligations in exchange for conservation. 122 Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency Chief William Reilly expects this plan
to mobilize up to $100 million a year for conservation.2 3 Thus, in
a single year, the United States government alone conceivably could
retire as much foreign debt as all the debt-for-nature swaps undertak-
en up to 1990. The benefit from sovereign creditor-funded debt
swaps would increase tremendously if other Paris Club mem-
bers-such as Germany, Great Britain, France and Japan, each of
whom hold billions of dollars in debt obligations of Latin American,
Eastern European, African, and other countries-followed the lead of
the United States. The German government, for example, has already
agreed to retire $60 million in Polish debts to finance environmental
assistance programs. 24 With debt donations from sovereign credi-
tors, debt-for-nature swaps can be expected to proliferate, greatly
benefitting the environment and retiring truly significant amounts of
debt.
Largely as a result of these recent developments, debtor
countries that formerly criticized debt-for-nature swaps have begun
espousing them. At the end of 1989, the Brazilian government, for
instance, was dead set against debt-for-nature swaps; six months later,
Brazilian President Fernando Collor de Mello declared that Brazil
121. See von Moltke, supra note 46, at 982-83.
122. Peter Passell, Washington Offers Mountain of Debt To Save Forests, N.Y. TImES,
Jan. 22, 1991, at C1.
123. Id.
124. See French, supra note 119, at 48.
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would welcome swaps.'2 By the end of 1990, Brazilian officials
began to propose swaps of their own. 126
Moreover, the entrance of sovereign debtors into the swap
market almost certainly will fuel other kinds of public benefit-oriented
debt conversion schemes. One such scheme is the "debt-for-develop-
ment" swap, 127 which promotes health-care, educational and other
developmental programs in needy debtor countries. In a debt-for-
development swap, a creditor bank or sovereign creditor sells or
donates debt paper to a nonprofit international organization, such as
UNICEF or CARE, that already operates programs in the participating
debtor country. For example, UNICEF annually spends $3 million on
programs it operates in Mexico. Under a debt-for-development
arrangement, UNICEF could use those funds to purchase Mexican
debt paper steeply discounted on the secondary market. 128  Then,
UNICEF would sell the debt paper back to the Mexican government
at face value or slightly less in local currency. Any amount paid by
the Mexican government in excess of the secondary market price
would provide UNICEF with a larger operating budget for its
programs in that country.'29
The main problem with debt-for-development swaps has been
that few international relief organizations have budgets permitting
them to purchase enough debt from private commercial banks to do
much good.130  Now, however, with sovereign creditors willing to
125. See, e.g., Ren6 Villegas, Brazil Now Favors Debt-for-Nature Swaps, REUTERS, May
8, 1990, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File.
126. See, e.g., Gary Marx, Rain Forest Destruction in Brazil Slows, but Critics Remain
Wary, Clu. T.IB., Nov. 30, 1990, at 29. Brazil is not alone. See, e.g., Jonathan Lynn, E.
Europe Considers Debt-for-Nature Swaps, Reuters, April 2, 1991.
127. See generally Burton, supra note 37.
128. Alternatively, the bank could donate the debt to the nonprofit, charitable agency and
receive a full cost basis tax write off, under the current interpretation of the U.S. Treasury
Department. Rev. Rul. 87-124, 1987-2 C.B. 205, 206. See Ronny Jay Halperin, Comment,
Revenue Ruling 87-124: Treasury's Flawed Interpretation of Debt-for-Nature Swaps, 43 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 721, 724-25 (1989).
129. Burton, supra note 37, at 234-235. Even Ms. Burton has doubts as to whether a
vast, government-funded organization like UNICEF, subject to various political pressures, is
"likely to engage in experimental programs such as debt swaps." Id. at 243-44. She
suggests that smaller, privately funded organizations, such as Lutheran World Relief or
CARE, would be more likely candidates to participate in such programs. Id.
130. The total debt owed by developing states to creditors in wealthier states now
exceeds $1 trillion. See Burton, supra note 37, at 235. In 1988, UNICEF, which is one of
the world's largest nonprofit organizations, had total program expenditures of $375 million.
Id. at 243. Even if UNICEF were to apply its entire operating budget to purchasing debt,
which is extremely unlikely, this would have only limited value as a debt reduction plan.
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donate debt, international nonprofit organizations will not be limited
by the purchasing power of their own operating budgets. The
sovereign creditors should be willing to donate debt for reasons of
political economy; debt donation is a relatively inexpensive way to
finance foreign assistance. Meanwhile, debtor countries will benefit
from the increased developmental investment-for agricultural
production, health care, education, etc.-as well as from significant
reductions in their external debts.
On the other hand, the participation of sovereign creditors in the
swap market is likely to have little impact on debt-equity swaps. The
Paris Club explicitly authorized its members to engage in debt-equity
swaps, but most govemments will probably choose not to do so for
political reasons."' Unlike other conversion schemes, debt-equity
swaps do not provide clear and direct public benefits in the debtor
country; they mainly provide investment incentives for private profit.
It could be a serious diplomatic blunder for any creditor government
to donate or sell debt paper for private profit, especially when part,
if not most, of the expense is ultimately borne by the debtor govern-
ment. Furthermore, sovereign creditors, unlike private commercial
banks, are incapable of participating as investors in debt-equity
swaps; for obvious reasons of sovereignty, debtor countries would
never permit foreign governments to obtain significant financial
control over any segment of their domestic economies.
Debt-equity swaps likely will continue to be financed predomi-
nantly, if not exclusively, by private commercial banks. But, as
discussed earlier,132 even this funding source has already begun to
dry up; because their own financial situation has improved, the banks
now have less incentive than they once did to sell debt paper below
face value on the secondary market. The extent of the banks' future
participation can be expected to fluctuate with the markets and the
banks' own financial circumstances.
131. However, this is by no means certain. The U.S. government has been a vociferous
proponent of debt-equity swap programs in the past, and it is not beyond the realm of
possibility that they will back up their support with funding. In fact, the American
government has been severely criticized for supporting debt-equity swaps. See, e.g., Panel
Discussion on Latin American Adjustment: The Record and Next Steps, in LATIN AMERICAN
ADJuSTmENT: How MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 312,324 (John Williamson ed., 1990) (remarks
of Rudiger Dornbusch, Professor of Economics at Mass. Inst. of Tech.) ('Washington has
been obscene in advocating debt-equity swaps and in insisting that they be part of the debt
strategy. The U.S. Treasury has made this dogma, and the IMF and the World Bank, against
their staffs' professional advice and judgment, have simply caved in.").
132. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS: AVOIDING A PERPETUAL
DEBT CRISIS
Optimism over the potential of debt-for-nature and debt-for-
development schemes to relieve the debt burdens of poor debtor
countries must be tempered by the knowledge that, so far, they have
not made even a dent in the world debt crisis. Almost every large
debtor country today carries far more debt than when the crisis first
began in 1981-82 (see Appendix). In the last year alone, total
developing country debt climbed six percent to $1.34 trillion. 3
Despite promising recent developments, questions remain for
sovereign debtors about the economics of debt-for-nature swaps and
debt-for-development schemes. According to some economists,
printing money or sacrificing precious foreign exchange reserves to
buy back debt is simply "bad business."''134 Beyond that, some
needy debtors might not be able to afford in the first instance to buy
back the debt paper.135 Poland, for example, has plenty of potential
uses for debt-for-nature swaps, but the Polish government today
hardly can afford to buy back (even at a steep discount) enough of its
debt paper to fund many of them. 36 Clearly, debt swaps alone will
never end the debt crisis.
International debt analysts acknowledge that the debt crisis will
end only when debtor country economies grow out of it. 3' To
achieve sustained growth, debtor governments must adopt economic
and institutional policies that promote investment while restricting
inflation.138 Creditors, especially Western governments, should
133. Jube Shiver, Jr., Economic Reforms Help Latin America Ease Its Debt Crisis, L.A.
TIMEs, Dec. 26, 1990, at Dl.
134. Panel Discussion on Latin American Adjustment: The Record and Next Steps, supra
note 131, at 322 (remarks of Rudiger Dornbusch, Professor of Economics at Mass. Inst. of
Tech.).
135. Remember, in a debt-for-nature swap an environmental organization obtains the debt
paper, by sale or donation, from either a private commercial bank or, now, from a sovereign
creditor. To make the swap work, the environmental organization must be able to sell (or
resell) the debt paper (at face value or slightly less) to the debtor government. See supra
note 89 and accompanying text. If the debtor country has too many needs and too few funds,
debt-for-nature swaps will not work, no matter how much money sovereign creditors are
willing to donate.
136. See, e.g., Eugeniusz Fadlis, Debt-for-Nature Swaps: The Business of Environmental
Clean-Up, GAZETA INT'L, Nov. 29, 1990, available in LEXIS, World Library, ALLWLD
File.
137. See, e.g., KUCZYNSKI, supra note 4, at 211.
138. Id.
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support debtor country efforts to this end by quickly and completely
removing the barrier to economic growth posed by massive pre-
existing debts. In other words, they should encourage economic
reforms by actually forgiving debt. By reducing net debt and,
consequently, interest payments, debtors can begin to save and
eventually rededicate hard currency reserves to economically
productive investment.
Debt forgiveness long has been an "X-rated" term for Western
governments, MDBs and private commercial banks.139 They have
been afraid that if they canceled one country's debts, an avalanche of
forgiveness pleas would follow from others."4  This is almost
certainly true, but each debtor's claim could be addressed indepen-
dently on its own merits; debt forgiveness can and should be
restricted to debtor countries demonstrating a strong and sustained
commitment to meaningful economic reforms. Creditors are also
concerned that debt cancellation would create the impression that they
will capitulate whenever a debtor nation has problems making
payments. But this misconstrues the aim of debt cancellation; it is
not a matter of mercy, but of inducement to sound economic
practices, which ultimately make the debtor country a better credit
risk for future lending and, in some cases, open new markets for
international trade and investment. Moreover, debt forgiveness would
not come without costs to debtor countries; it would be essentially an
investment in their economic reforms.'
4
'
Recently, the international financial community's traditional
distaste for debt forgiveness has begun to wane, as other alternatives
like debt-equity and debt-for-nature swaps fail to reduce net debt
substantially. Western nations have already agreed to reduce debts by
up to thirty-three percent for poor African countries.' 42  On March
139. Robinson, supra note 10, at 102.
140. See, e.g., Benjamin J. Cohen, An International Chapter 11, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 11,
1987, at A23.
141. Some commentators have suggested a bankruptcy-like mechanism for this kind of
combined debt-forgiveness and economic restructuring. For example, Professor Benjamin
Cohen, of Tufts University's Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, has suggested the
establishment of a kind of international Chapter 11 for sovereign creditors to be administered
by an "International Debt Restructuring Agency." This agency, operating like a domestic
bankruptcy court, would negotiate an agreement between a distressed sovereign debtor and
its creditors, granting permanent relief in exchange for enforceable economic reforms. After
completing the reforms, the debtor country would have its creditworthiness restored. IL See
generally Sklar, Comment, supra note 18.
142. Steven Greenhouse, Poland Asks West to Cancel Most of Its Big Foreign Debt, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1991, at Cl.
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15, 1991, the Group of Seven industrial nations agreed to cancel
outright fifty percent of Poland's $30.8 billion debt to member
countries, in view of that country's ambitious and pioneering "shock
therapy" transition from socialism to a free market economic
system.143 The Bush Administration went even further, reducing
Poland's $3.8 billion debt to the United States by fully seventy
percent. 4 Thus, in one fell swoop, Poland's debt burden was cut
by more than $16 billion. The impact of this debt relief on Poland's
143. James Risen, Western Nations Reward Poland by Halving Its Debt, L.A. TIMES,
Mar. 16, 1991, at Dl. Under the "shock therapy" program, the Polish government de-
controlled all prices, set limits on wage increases, established a domestically convertible
currency, and developed a plan to privatize virtually all state-owned industries and
enterprises. See, e.g., Cole, supra note 38, at 218-219.
The Group of Seven's debt forgiveness plan for Poland was not agreed to
unanimously, however. The Japanese government objected strongly to outright forgiveness
of Poland's debts on grounds that it would encourage financial irresponsibility by debtor
countries and set a bad precedent, leading other debtor countries to seek similar relief
whenever they had any trouble meeting their obligations. The Japanese also objected to the
Polish debt forgiveness plan because it was based on political considerations-Poland's
conversion from socialism to a free market economic system-rather than economics. See,
e.g., James Sterngold, Japan Retreating on Promised Loans, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 14, 1991, at
Al. To further express their displeasure, the Japanese subsequently reneged on a promised
$500 million loan to Poland. Id. Finally, in February 1992, the Japanese and Polish
governments entered into a debt restructuring agreement. See Japan Reschedules Polish
Debt, Kyodo News Service, Feb. 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, OMNI File.
l The Japanese position on Polish debt forgiveness has been called" 'unconscionable,'
'coldly financial,' and 'Calvinist.' " See Stemgold, supra. It is a most ironic position for
a country like Japan to take, given the economic benefits it received from the West-for
purely political reasons-following World War II; and it is especially ironic in view of the
tragedy of Poland's plight, as the only member of the allied forces to "lose" the war, so to
speak.
Japan has merely expressed the traditional arguments of creditor countries against
debt forgiveness, which I discussed earlier: forgiving one country's debts could lead to an
avalanche of debt relief pleas from other countries, and would encourage countries to seek
debt relief at the first sign of economic difficulties. See supra notes 140-141 and
accompanying text. Aside from these visions of doom, Japan has not explained why political
motives are invalid reasons for granting debt forgiveness, which is, after all, just another kind
of economic assistance. Nor has Japan explained why or how an avalanche of debt
forgiveness claims would be a bad thing. Certainly, granting debt forgiveness in one case
does not commit the Group of Seven to accede to every claim; each claim can be decided
on its own merits. In any case, none of the major creditor countries of the world seem to
share (at least, not to the same degree) Japan's concerns over the potential negative effects
of debt forgiveness. Japan is the only member of the Group of Seven for whom "debt
forgiveness" remains a forbidden phrase.
As this article goes to press, Japan has begun to soften its position on debt
forgiveness for Poland. See Japan May Conditionally Forgive Part of Polish Debt, PAP
News Wire, Mar. 19, 1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, WIRES File.
144. Clifford Krauss, Bush Greets Walesa With Debt Relief, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1991,
atA3.
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economic situation is sure to be significant, though it is difficult to
quantify at this early stage. By way of comparison, the amount of
debt reduction achieved through this single agreement is roughly 160
times the total debt reduction achieved by all the debt-for-nature
swaps ever executed, 145 and approximately equal to the total amount
of Latin American debt converted to equity over the past decade.' 46
U.S. debt forgiveness for Poland will also benefit the environ-
ment substantially. Pursuant to the debt forgiveness agreement,
Poland must dedicate ten percent of U.S. forgiven debt (or about
$266 million) to fund environmental projects.147 According to one
Polish official, debt forgiveness by the United States and other
creditor countries will generate roughly three billion ziotych
($300 thousand) per year for environmental protection.1 41 This
estimate soon may increase by a factor of ten. On June 11, 1991,
then Polish Prime Minister Jan Krzystof Bielecki proposed to the
Paris Club the "world's largest debt-for-nature exchange scheme,"
which would reduce Poland's debts to Western governments by an
additional ten percent, thereby generating an estimated $3.1 billion
over eighteen years for an internationally monitored environmental
protection fund. Over its first three years, the plan would produce
$120 million annually for environmental protection in Poland; the
amount would rise to $300 million per year for the remaining fifteen
years of the program.'49
Admittedly, Poland's situation is politically unique; Western
governments have a special stake in facilitating Poland's successful
transition from socialism to capitalism. In the long run, however,
they may find they have just as much to gain from ending the debt
crisis in Africa and Latin America. Aside from the economic
benefits, including increased trade opportunities, that would ultimately
ensue from a combined program of debt cancellation and economic
reform, Western industrialized nations would profit from the increased
145. See supra text accompanying note 108.
146. See supra text accompanying note 61.
147. See Przekud, dlug na ekologig (To Swap Debt for Ecology), GAzETA WYBORCZA,
Apr. 11, 1991, at 5.
148. l
149. See Alina Bialkowska, Part of Polish Debt to Be Spent on Environment, Polish
News Bulletin, June 12, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, PNBUL File. The Paris
Club has not yet acted on Prime Minister Bielecki's proposal. However, Norway, Sweden,
the United States and France are all on record in support of the initiative. See Christopher
Bobinski, Poles Seek to Swap Debt for Nature, FIN. TIMES, June 12, 1991, at 4.
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regional political stability that relative economic prosperity would
bring.
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APPENDIX
TOTAL EXTERNAL DEBT FOR SELECTED DEBTOR
COUNTRIES, 1981-1988
(Source: World Bank, World Tables (1989-1990))
1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
(billions of 1989 U.S. dollars)
80.6
15.7
3.3
.81
78.2
20.9
92.2 97.5 104.3 104.6 112.0 123.9 114.6
17.3 17.9 19.7 20.4 21.1 21.5 19.6
3.6 4.2 4.0 4.4 4.5 4.7 4.5
.86 .88 .88 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.3
86.0 93.0 94.8 96.9 100.9 109.3 101.6
24.5 24.3 24.2 26.6 28.3 30.1 29.4
** * ** 33.3 36.7 42.6 42.1
Brazil
Chile
Costa Rica
Malawi
Mexico
Philippines
Poland
